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Summary
Analyses of the concept of law rely on certain self ‑evident truths: 
truisms (platitudes) about law that people generally share and 
which reflect their common understanding of this important social 
concept. General legal theories are products of such analyses. In 
this paper I argue that every reference to truisms in the context 
of legal theory building should also take into account inferential 
processes by which truisms themselves are coined, namely differ‑
ent types of heuristics about law and related phenomena. Since 
both truisms and heuristics are unstructured, often inconsistent, 
and even fallible, conceptual analyses are the main means of trans‑
forming such “raw” evidence into rationally structured legal the‑
ories.
Keywords: conceptual analysis, truisms, platitudes, general juris‑
prudence, heuristics, law, Scott Shapiro
Streszczenie
Analizy pojęcia prawa odwołują się do szczególnego rodzaju oczywi‑
stych prawd: tzw. truizmów o prawie, które wypowiadają członkowie 
danej społeczności, a które odzwierciedlają ich wspólne rozumienie 
tego ważnego pojęcia społecznego. Ogólne teorie prawa powstają 
w wyniku prowadzenia tego rodzaju analiz. W tym artykule argu‑
mentuję, że każde odpowiedzialne odwołanie się do truizmów w kon‑
tekście budowy teorii prawa powinno także uwzględniać procesy 
rozumowania, które doprowadzają do wykształcenia się truizmów 
w danej populacji, a są nimi rozmaite rodzaje heurystyk na temat 
prawa i powiązanych z nim zjawisk społecznych. Z uwagi na to, że 
zarówno same truizmy, jak i heurystyki nie mają jednolitej struktu‑
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ry i bywają niespójne, analizy pojęciowe stanowią główne sposoby 
przekształcenia tego „surowego” materiału dowodowego w racjonal‑
nie uporządkowane teorie prawa.
Słowa kluczowe: analiza pojęciowa, truizmy, ogólna teoria prawa, 
heurystyki, prawo, Scott Shapiro
1. The pragmatic character of conceptual analysis
Many contemporary legal philosophers who work within the 
field of general jurisprudence engage in conceptual analyses 
of fundamental legal concepts. Their most general concern 
pertains to the very concept of law. Those legal philosophers 
seem to apply the descriptive method of analysis that is quite 
traditional in its merit, and only modern in its form, such as 
Canberra ‑style conceptual analysis (or some methodologically 
weakened version of it; Shapiro 2011). Usually, this kind of 
analysis – as pursued in its modest version – is supposed to 
“tell us what to say in less fundamental terms given an ac‑
count of the world stated in more fundamental terms” (Jack‑
son 1998, 44).1 As such, the analysis is supposed to “resolve 
and explain what is complex in more simple terms” (Himma 
2015, 74). Thus, it seems that such modern understanding of 
conceptual analysis strongly relies on a traditional, “decompo‑
sitional” type of analysis.2 This method still seems to be a vi‑
able position in legal theory, notwithstanding the force of the 
pragmatic critique of the analytic ‑synthetic distinction and 
1 Frank Jackson describes conceptual analysis also as “the very busi‑
ness of addressing when and whether a story told in one vocabulary is 
made true by one told in some allegedly more fundamental vocabulary” 
(Jackson 1998, 28).
2 It seems obvious that Jackson’s analysis, which seeks to increase 
the understanding of our concept usage by reducing complex concepts to 
sets of more fundamental concepts, is “decompositional”; the main idea is 
to speak to people “in their own language” (Harper 2012, 235–256).
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the prominence of arguments characteristic of the so ‑called 
naturalistic turn. In fact, as B. Leiter observes, legal philoso‑
phy “proceeds via conceptual analysis and intuition ‑pumping 
as though nothing had transpired in philosophy in the last 
forty years” (Leiter 2001, 142–146; cf. Taekema, van Klink, 
and de Been 2016, 12).
In this respect, the revived method of analysis is still used 
to analyze the “Fregean” concepts that fulfil the criteria of 
compositionality and refer to logically consistent, independent‑
ly existing contents (“senses” or “thoughts”). The method of 
analysis is supposed to “unpack” or “grasp” these contents. 
Unquestionably, however, such a method cannot be used to 
analyze more psychologically ‑determined concepts which, by 
their very nature, do not fulfill such criteria.3 It is a matter 
of philosophical controversy whether Fregean concepts exist 
and thus can be analyzed in a traditional way by philosophers 
who are fully competent users of language (Goldman 2007, 
1–26). The analysis of such concepts would strongly depend 
on a certain linguistic ability, often referred to as “mastery of 
the concept,” which is a kind of fully rational ability to provide 
an accurate and complete description of the concept’s internal 
structure.
Still, even if such concepts exist, there may be other types 
of concepts. In that case, the other standing controversy would 
be whether concept ‑terms that we are actually interested in 
are Fregean concepts or not. A mistake in answering that 
question may lead to related mistakes concerning the choice of 
3 In my view important social and institutional concepts are, at 
least partly, psychologically determined, so the classical method of anal‑
ysis cannot be used to “unpack” them. Their conceptual core is fixed by 
social, common beliefs (folk theories) comprised of truisms that depend 
on certain probabilistic arguments. As such, they do not possess a well‑
 ‑structured conceptual core like Fregean concepts. What makes psy‑
chological concepts less complete and logically structured and thus, not 
compositio nal would entail discussion that lies beyond the scope of this 
paper.
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the appropriate method of analysis itself (including mistaking 
one type of analysis for another).4
Many concept ‑terms do refer only to contents (conceptual 
cores) that exist in fragmentary and ephemeral forms, in which 
they usually cannot be used in discursive, logically ‑coined ar‑
guments. As such, these concepts need refining and further 
methodological treatment that may be mistakenly taken to be 
a decompositional analysis. Truisms that set up the founda‑
tion of a concept’s reference are, in the case of “law,” manifold 
and inconsistent, and thus allow for many alternative, equally 
appropriate “cores” of the concept. In the latter case, the es‑
tablishment of conceptual content, as a target of “conceptual 
analysis,” is a matter of choosing certain sets of truisms about 
law, describing related, but fallible heuristics that people gen‑
erally apply when they think about the concept ‑terms in ques‑
tion in real ‑life situations and by these means “explicating” 
(i.e. making more explicit) the discussed concept. Certainly, the 
analysis of the former type, which is the analysis qua descrip‑
tion of the established content, and the analysis of the latter 
type, which is – as I argue – the analysis that aims at estab‑
lishing such content on the basis of (necessarily) fragmentary 
evidence, are two different types of analysis.
The classical method of analysis may be successfully com‑
pared to detective work. In his recent book, Legality, S. Sha‑
piro wrote:
Conceptual analysis can easily be thought of as a kind of de‑
tective work. Imagine that someone is murdered. The detec‑
tive will first look for evidence at the crime scene, collecting 
4 One may simply think that (s)he conducts a descriptive, decompo‑
sitional analysis, where, in fact, it would be a creative, intuitive activi‑
ty. Recently, such a mistake has often been ascribed to legal positivists 
(who, like Hart, think that they provide a descriptive account of law) by 
normatively ‑oriented theorists (like R. Dworkin or S. Perry) who argue 
that what positivists provide, in fact, is a conceptual construction rather 
than a description.
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as many clues as she can. She will study those clues hoping 
that the evidence, coupled with her knowledge of the world 
and human psychology, will help eliminate many of the sus‑
pects and lead her to the identity of the killer.
In conceptual analysis, the philosopher also collects clues and 
uses the process of elimination for a specific purpose, name‑
ly, to elucidate the identity of the entity that falls under the 
concept in question. The major difference between the phi‑
losopher and the police detective is that the evidence that 
the latter collects and analyses concerns true states of affairs 
whereas the former is primarily interested in truistic ones. 
The philosophical clues, in other words, are not merely true, 
but self ‑evidently so.
The key to conceptual analysis, then, is the gathering of tru‑
isms about a given entity. […] 
Again, truisms are the clues that help us determine the identity 
of the object in question. Although it is not necessary that our 
answer satisfy every single truism, we must try to come up with 
a theory that accounts for as many of them as possible. For if 
our account flouts too many of them, we will have changed the 
subject and will no longer be giving an account of the intended 
entity but of something else entirely. (Shapiro 2011, 5)
In this paper, I would like to draw some conclusions regarding 
treating the general concept of law as a concept that does not 
fulfil the compositionality criteria. As such, the concept of law 
cannot be analyzed in a traditional way by philosophers qua 
detectives. Although the departure point is still similar to a de‑
tective’s selection of evidence, the nature of the result is quite 
different: Whereas a detective tries to identify the wrongdoer 
and describe the causes and motives that led him/her to com‑
mit a crime (and in this way, describe facts), a legal philoso‑
pher is more like a craftsman or artisan who tries to produce 
a socially useful tool: a legal theory. The additional problem 
is, however, that the evidence itself is gathered in a somewhat 
eccentric way: It relies on general intuitions about law that 
are sometimes produced by the use of different types of heu‑
ristics. Heuristics are here understood in a more sophisticat‑
Adam Dyrda118
ed way, namely as processes of rapid categorization performed 
in typical, real ‑life situations in which people have to answer 
a general philosophical question, but somewhat indirectly. The 
point is that boiling down the “detective’s primary job” to col‑
lecting self ‑evident (truistic) evidence would be meaningless 
if it was supposed to ignore the typical ways of thinking that 
make people assent to such truisms. In short, I think that legal 
theorists – in their general inquiries – should not only start 
from assented “truths” (truisms as sentences), but should also 
rely on the classificatory modes of thought (heuristics) that 
produced them.5
To a large extent, my thesis may be interpreted as an ex‑
tension of a general critique of conceptual analysis produced 
by experimental philosophers and evolutionary psychologists 
to the field of jurisprudence. Experimentalists argue, first, 
that intuitions about cases are not stable and reliable grounds 
for exhaustive analysis, and second, that the best philosophical 
explanation of our philosophical intuitions makes no reference 
to facts, but rather only to individual psychological concepts 
(Stich 1975, 397–418; cf. Goldman 2007 and Harper 2012).6 
5 If ordinary people are asked the general question “what is law?,” 
they often have a problem in giving a rapid answer. Laypeople do not 
have any ready ‑made answers to that type of question. If such a question 
is asked, they try to answer it by indicating some example of a “typical” 
law (legal act, norm, etc.), some generally shared truth about law (what 
people generally say about law), and by means of certain heuristics, they 
produce other, presumably evident truths regarding law. For example, 
when asked “what is law?,” a layperson may imagine the Polish legal sys‑
tem as a typical system of law (in some simplified understanding of “sys‑
temacity”), and by means of heuristics, may answer questions about its 
characteristics (“Does that system have judges? – Yes, it does”; “Does that 
system have a hierarchical structure? – Yes, it does,” etc.).
6 Harper writes: “Given that we are only justified in believing in 
those entities which are part of the best explanation of our evidence, we 
are only justified by our intuitions in believing in concepts and not in 
facts,” and he calls this kind of objection “the explanationist objection” 
(ibidem).
Truisms, Heuristics and the Concept of Law 119
Experimentalist legal thinkers assume that there are no in‑
dependently existing Fregean concepts regarding “law,” the 
content of which can be uniquely analyzed, and moreover, that 
there is no description that can be deemed entirely true or 
false, because no relevant truth ‑maker exists.
That, however, does not necessarily mean that “tradi‑
tional” analyses of such concepts are not valuable, even if, to 
a large extent, they are actually profoundly creative activities. 
According to A. Harper, analyses may have an “oblique epis‑
temic value” as they “necessitate a directed and systematic 
creativity which reliably produce[s] ideas of a potentially fruit‑
ful structure: they are universal, unifying, simple theories” 
(Harper 2012, 237). The obliqueness of philosophical analysis 
is demonstrated by the fact that analysis “accumulates in a di‑
rection other than the primary goal”: It may not lead to any 
plausible (or even true) description of the conceptual content, 
but nonetheless, it may produce interesting and useful results 
in related fields such as meta ‑ethics or methodology (ibidem). 
Although Harper generally defends the relevance of tradition‑
al conceptual analysis in the context of the naturalistic frame‑
work, I am rather inclined to oppose that claim – at least local‑
ly, i.e. in the field of general jurisprudence – but, at the same 
time, I am eager to defend his contention regarding the oblique 
value of analyses, understood as creative activities that may be 
structured according to certain norms of theory ‑construction. 
These norms shall, however, be understood as common, ratio‑
nal and consistent applications of heuristic rules in contexts 
in which the analyzed concepts play a pivotal role.7 Otherwise, 
7 We can speak of two types of intuitions: (1) simple intuitions about 
primary conceptual content, usually referred to as truisms or platitudes 
regarding the concept ‑term in question (static intuitions), and (2) deriv‑
ative or inferential intuitions, which are the common ways of thinking or 
conceptualising these concept ‑terms in certain contexts (dynamic intu‑
itions, heuristic’s results).
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the analyses may not be recognized as analyses regarding the 
concept ‑terms to which they supposedly refer.
Thus, relying on certain pragmatic assumptions with re‑
spect to the nature of analysis and theory ‑building, I think 
that at best – in the case of “law” – the analysis in general 
jurisprudence, in which I am mostly interested, is in a sub‑
stantial part constructive and not merely reconstructive. The 
analysis of the concept (e.g. of law) is not a matter of simply 
giving an accurate description of the conceptual content em‑
bedded in the actual linguistic usage of a (certain) community, 
but is rather a creative construction of a particular concept in 
virtue of it. To use a popular phrase, the content of the con‑
cept of law exists in virtue of (and thus, is grounded in) gen‑
erally shared truisms and generally applied heuristics about 
law, but it is not reducible to them. Eventually, any analysis 
is supposed to provide a better understanding of the analyzed 
phenomena, but what that better means seems to be an open 
question. I suppose that analysis improves our understanding 
of a concept by developing, testing and reshaping it for prac‑
tical purposes, and for this reason, analyzing is itself a prac‑
tical activity. Analyses are a practical means for making our 
concept ‑terms more useful in institutional practice that is lin‑
guistic in character.
In my view, different general theories of law (that aim to 
describe the content of the concept of law) are not accounts of 
how language is actually used, complemented by one, proper 
theory of the object implied by them, but are rather accounts 
of how language should (or even ought to) be used, at least in 
cases that are not typically thought of by laypeople and law‑
yers, and ultimately – how the characteristics of the object 
(given in certain details) should be construed.
Theory ‑building is not an activity to which no general stan‑
dards apply. In particular, it is not true that “anything goes” in 
legal theorizing. There are at least two elements that limit the 
creativity of a theoretician: (1) commonly shared intuitions, 
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beliefs, etc. about law, which serve as theoretical “evidence,” 
a departure point for theory building; evidence, as usual, may 
merely underdetermine the theoretical description; and (2) 
generally accepted methods of theory ‑construction that serve 
as a tool for transforming evidence into theory. Although the 
law is a mind ‑dependent artifact, and for this reason, general 
legal theories are usually supposed to describe what is called 
“our understanding of social institution,” our (self)under‑
standing – fortunately or not – is not a strong enough founda‑
tion, or a departure point, for such a detailed description. From 
the quantitative point of view, there is simply too much evi‑
dence on which legal theorists build their theories, including 
commonly shared “law ‑related propositions” or “law ‑related 
thoughts,” which are the premises or conclusions of the law‑
 ‑related heuristics that we – people living in different societies 
– perform every day. There is too much evidence, because the 
truisms that represent these propositions (or thoughts) do not 
constitute a consistent set: Many of them do contradict each 
other (at least in some interpretations), and to build a theo‑
ry, one has to choose. People usually rely on these truisms in 
their common heuristics without any deeper reflection upon 
the possible relations between them. Truisms are like prem‑
ises in a simple reasoning, which almost never lead to a thor‑
oughly uncontroversial conclusion. The more sophisticated, 
reflective and theory ‑laden the reasoning is, and the further 
it goes, the more controversial the possible output becomes. 
And we talk here merely about most of the heuristics that are 
triggered by the question “What is law?,” i.e. a question of the 
type asked to students in their first classes in law school. For 
this reason, a theoretician is overwhelmed with evidence that 
(s)he, like a judge, has to evaluate freely and come to a ver‑
dict about which part of it (s)he should believe (and which he 
should not).
From the qualitative point of view, all this evidence is 
surely not enough: Truisms, together with fallible heuris‑
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tics, do not and never will tell the whole story about law (the 
so ‑called folk theory of law is not a “theory” in a technical 
sense).8 For this reason, there arises a paradox “of legal the‑
orizing”. M. Dubowska and I described it elsewhere in the 
following way:
[…] one can develop many competing theories of law on the 
basis of one set of truisms. However, the more detailed the 
theory is, the more it must focus on certain truisms and defy 
other truisms. The way one “reflectively thinks” about cer‑
tain theoretical matters forces him/her to prefer some tru‑
isms over other ones. In such circumstances, the theoretical 
virtue of being coherent and nit ‑picking (with respect to cer‑
tain theoretical details) makes a developed theory less truistic 
and more controversial. By conducting his/her theoretical en‑
terprise, a theoretician moves farther and farther away from 
a generally shared (truistic) set of propositions about the law. 
By its very nature, every legal theory is controversial. This 
“paradox of (legal) theorizing” is a theoretical analogue of the 
so ‑called “paradox of analysis” indicated 75 years ago by C.H. 
Langford. According to Langford, an analysis of a certain 
(supposedly analytical) sentence can be either correct or in‑
formative (but it cannot be both). We think that legal theories 
cannot be both trivial and informative, because if they are 
trivial, they do not develop, but merely repeat, all the truisms 
about the law, and if they are informative, they are inherently 
controversial (because they deem some of the truisms to be 
false, or, at least, reinterpret them in a nonstandard way). 
(Dubowska and Dyrda 2018, 55–56)
2. Truisms, generalizations and heuristics
Truisms about law are supposed to express common intuitions 
regarding law. These intuitions are, however, context depen‑
dent, because they are developed in the context of the pre‑
 ‑existing social structure: various existing social institutions 
8 With respect to the idea of “folk theory,” see for example Dyrda 
2017, chapter 2 and the references provided therein.
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and interconnected rules. It is hardly possible for a person 
alienated from society, who never existed in it or “played by 
social rules” (“Mowgli”), to be able to produce any relevant 
intuitions regarding these (societal) institutions, including law 
(by some type of pure a priori reasoning). We may thus as‑
sume that truisms reveal the intuitions of people who are typ‑
ical participants in society (they are “normal” social agents). 
One should note, however, that even in this case, the eviden‑
tial weight and plausibility of these truisms as adequate “ev‑
idence” are dubious for at least two reasons. Consider first 
the reliability of the intuitions themselves. There is a strong 
disagreement between philosophers with respect to their ev‑
idential status. Some, such as S. Kripke, argue that they are 
the best possible evidence one may ever have (Kripke 1980, 42; 
cf. Goldman 2007, 2). But many philosophers seriously ques‑
tion the assumption that intuitions may have any evidential 
weight.9 Apart from that objection, we may make a moderate 
assumption that intuitions about social institutions and arti‑
facts, such as law, shared by most active participants of soci‑
eties, are generally reliable. Then, however, arises the second 
problem regarding the relation between intuitions and the tru‑
isms that are supposed to represent them. Truisms are linguis‑
tic expressions of intuitions, and because language may not be 
able to express the full content of our thoughts, the meaning 
of truisms may certainly be narrower than the content of the 
intuitions that are supposed to be expressed by them. More‑
over, individuals may commit themselves to assenting to the 
same truisms, in spite of having actually somewhat different 
beliefs and intuitions. This means that people having slightly 
different psychological concepts and connected intuitions may 
assent to the same sentences qua truisms.
9 See also Cappelen 2012, where the reliability of intuitions in phi‑
losophy is thoroughly questioned; and Gizbert ‑Studnicki, Dyrda, and 
Grabowski 2016, 152, for the list of the relevant literature.
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As I argued elsewhere, truisms can be plausibly under‑
stood as expressed generic generalizations to which most 
participants in society assent (cf. Dyrda 2017, 302–312). 
Following M. Johnston and S. ‑J. Leslie, I argued that con‑
cepts should be understood as individuals’ interpretations of 
“concepts ‑as ‑terms ‑in ‑use,” which are a type of psychological 
concept (i.e. mental representations that play an essential role 
in people’s general classificatory and deliberative activities; 
cf. Weinberg, Nichols and Stich 2001, 429–460; cf. Goldman 
2007, 3). In this account, the knowledge regarding the use of 
concepts is practical. To know how to use a concept ‑term in 
this sense does not mean to know, and/or to be able to know, 
all the necessary and sufficient criteria for the concept ‑term’s 
application. What suffices is general “knowledge,” comprised 
of some effective, practical criteria for selecting the most 
prominent types of the concept ‑terms’ designates or charac‑
teristics (via which one identifies the designates). Usually, 
while performing their classificatory activities, people rely on 
the characteristics of the object in question that appear typi‑
cal (this is the so ‑called typicality effect; cf. Rosch 1973, 328; 
Rosch 1978, 27–48). There are at least two theories that ex‑
plain this simple fact: the theory of prototypes and the theory‑
 ‑theory of concepts. According to the first one, we determine 
the prototype ‑concepts by a statistical or quasi ‑statistical as‑
sessment of the probability of there being a designate having 
certain prototypical features. The famous definitions of man: 
“man is a featherless biped” (Plato) or “man is a political an‑
imal [zoon politicon]” (Aristotle), likewise the common defini‑
tion of a dog as a “quadrupled barking caudate mammal” rely 
on such generalizations and may be easily falsified by provid‑
ing (rare) instances of men or dogs who do not possess such 
typical characteristics. Usually, the context and interests of 
people determine which observational features they treat as 
salient or typical enough as to make them play such a substan‑
tial role in their classificatory activities. In the second theory, 
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our classificatory activities depend heavily on the pre ‑existing 
webs ‑of ‑beliefs that people share.10
According to M. Johnston and S. ‑J. Leslie, the best theory 
explaining the nature of our classificatory ‑conceptual activities 
is a hybrid theory combining these two (cf. Johnston and Leslie 
2012, 123). The explanation that these two theories together 
give seems to be a psychological counterpart of the pragmat‑
ic, behavioristic approach to language meaning presented by 
W.V. Quine. The relevant connection between the two theo‑
ries seems obvious: The prototype ‑theory stays in close con‑
nection to Quine’s theory of observation ‑sentences (which are 
as theory ‑lacking as possible), and the theory ‑theory stays in 
close connection to Quine’s theory of stimulus synonyms (as 
dependent on shared theoretical commitments, regarding col‑
lateral information, and thus, as theory ‑laden as possible). I do 
not want to get into the details of these pragmatic theories of 
observation sentences and stimulus synonymy here, because 
they have been exhaustively discussed in the literature for 
more than 50 years (cf. Quine 1960).
Our psychological ability to categorize determines our oth‑
er ability – to generalize. Traditional theories of concepts claim 
that every generalization is a categorical judgement, where‑
as the prototype theory claims that all generalizations are 
statistical ‑probability judgements. Furthermore, the holistic 
theory ‑theory account assumes that generalizations are theory‑
 ‑laden truisms. Experimental, psychological research confirms 
that most common types of generalizations are not categorical 
judgements, but are rather generic ones (cf. Leslie and Ler ner 
2016). The truisms “Books are paperbacks” or “Mosquitoes 
spread malaria” are examples of such generic generalizations. 
They play a fundamental role in using concepts and language 
learning by applying various types of heuristics. The truth 
of generic generalizations is insensitive to counterexamples. 
10 With respect to the theory ‑theory of concepts see Carey 2009.
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That feature distinguishes them from categorical generaliza‑
tions which are deemed false by any counterexample. Generic 
generalizations are not definitely quantified11: People do not 
use them to express their judgements about all instances of 
a discussed object, but only about some significant set of them. 
The truth ‑profile of categorical generalizations is a relatively 
simple one in comparison to the highly sophisticated truth‑
 ‑profiles of the generic ones (Johnston and Leslie 2012, 125).
We may assume that most truisms expressed by laypeo‑
ple are of a generic, rather than a categorical nature. They 
do not aim to provide the characteristics that all designates 
of the concept ‑term share, but rather, they want to produce 
some useful characteristics of the object (class of objects). The 
usefulness or practicality of such generalizations is easily re‑
vealed in typical circumstances, i.e. the ones that are similar 
to those in which the generic characteristics were developed. 
The generic generalization that “Mosquitoes spread malaria” 
is a useful truth about mosquitoes if one is put into the context 
of a tropical climate. Only in such contexts – which may be the 
actual ones or only experiments in the imagination, etc. – is 
one triggered to infer some further conclusions about what to 
think and what course of action to take.12 As such, generaliza‑
11 As non ‑quantified sentences such truisms cannot be judged true 
or false. When quantified universally, they are in fact usually false (not 
all books are paperbacks, some of them are hardbacks; not all mosqui‑
tos spread malaria, only some of them, namely Asian female night ‑biting 
Anopheles mosquitoes spread malaria). When quantified existentially, 
they are true. However, once people quantify them definitely, they cease 
to be a comfortable and simple means for heuristic thinking.
12 This may be easily shown by means of construing different exam‑
ples of implicatures. For example, there will be a practical difference as to 
the function of the sentence “Mosquitoes spread malaria” if the following 
took place in tropical (where mosquitoes spread malaria) and continental 
climates (where they do not): “– I’m going for a walk to the forest. I need 
some fresh air! – Wait, don’t you know that mosquitoes spread malaria?” 
(for other examples provided see Johnston and Leslie 2012).
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tions of this kind play an essential role in the heuristics lead‑
ing to rapid, practical classificatory decisions.
By heuristics, I mean – as it is usually described – commonly 
applied reflective activities that are aimed at problem ‑solving. 
They are mental programs that produce a judgement quickly, 
relying in the process on very limited information.13 Defined as 
such “decision rules,” heuristics usually have a high practical 
success rate in certain, fixed contexts of action, but are none‑
theless prone to error. They are a rather pragmatic means of 
dealing with the problems of real life that rely on a certain 
(ancestral) track ‑record of actions performed in a certain en‑
vironment – and in this sense, they stay in close connection to 
the pragmatic ideas of “reflective thinking,” “testing,” “trial 
and error,” etc.14 One might also describe heuristics as modes 
of thinking that, while providing generalizations, depend on 
particular instances (and thus are, at least to some extent, 
inductive in nature). However, because the mode of general‑
izing is not thoroughly logically (deductively) structured, in‑
ferential errors may appear. On the other hand, even logically 
well ‑structured heuristics may lead to “errors” regarding the 
characteristics of the object upon which one reflects. The very 
idea of “error” here is, however, dependent on some external 
and more detailed theory of an object to which the heuristics 
practically apply. So, to say that people make mistakes in their 
heuristics requires some external criterion: the true descrip‑
tion of the object they do not possess in the first place (as the 
premises of the reasoning).
13 “Decision rules are mechanisms, programs with a causal structure. 
They were designed to produce fitness ‑promoting outcomes in the environ‑
ments that selected for their structure.” (Cosmides and Tooby 2006, 193).
14 As L. Cosmides and J. Tooby write: “[A] growing body of evidence 
supports the view that the human mind was tailored by natural selection 
to develop certain social and moral heuristics: decision rules that quickly 
produce social and moral judgments, based on limited information.” (Cos‑
mides and Tooby 2006, 182).
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Notwithstanding, heuristics are common methods of think‑
ing and classifying, and for this reason they are an interesting 
object of study for legal theoreticians and analysts who aim 
at providing a general theory of law on the basis of commonly 
shared sets of “truths” about law. For it seems quite reasonable 
to discriminate between two kinds of such truths: (1) shared, 
prima facie recognized truisms about law, and (2) truths that 
are derivable by some means of commonly accepted method 
of reflection upon these truisms – at this point heuristics may 
come into play. Both kinds of truisms, together with relevant 
contextual or collateral information, allow one to make a clas‑
sificatory decision. By means of generic generalization, stating 
the fact that objects having the features F and G are Q, one in‑
fers that because something has this feature, it must be Q. The 
need to make a decision triggers a heuristic process that yields 
a featured result. The decisions usually made in legal contexts 
are basically regarding the question of whether some object 
is law or not. By means of heuristics, the decision is almost 
intuitively or automatically made.15 The result – the decision 
– may still be independent from any theoretically developed, 
consistent account of what law is, because the intuitive process 
of reasoning was based on something pre ‑theoretical. But the 
decision itself, once it has been inferred in the process, is a sig‑
nificant result of a classificatory activity, a result having many 
practical consequences both in the legal and moral spheres 
(which, I assume, may be interdependent). Both moral and 
other legal intuitions – or even well ‑established beliefs – may 
manifest themselves as inconsistent with, or even contradicto‑
ry to, the inferred classificatory decision. For this reason, one 
may have a strong feeling of oddness with respect to the result 
(decision). In other words, the experience of the result may 
be a recalcitrant experience, which would be odd at least be‑
15 The rationalisation of this procedure is often called an “operatio‑
nal interpretation” of law.
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cause the decision was based on intuitive truths (beliefs) in the 
first place. In such circumstances, the only way in which the 
decision ‑maker can deal with that difficult, almost existential 
situation with respect to his/her own intuitions and beliefs is 
to work the prima facie inconsistent beliefs into a manageable 
structure.16 At this point, a more thorough reflection comes 
into play in which the agent tries to provide a deeper expla‑
nation of the decision, tries to justify the verdict, and by these 
means – remove the feeling of oddness or doubt. But some‑
times, the deeper reflection may reveal the well ‑foundedness of 
our recalcitrant experience by providing reasons that defy the 
very premises of our initial heuristic reasoning. Sometimes, 
the premises of the reasoning and our doubts about the conclu‑
sions cannot be reconciled, and then one must make a choice to 
provide a consistent account: to decide which intuitions should 
be taken seriously and which should not. That is how, I sup‑
pose, general legal theories are born.
It follows that legal theories are theoretical rationalizations 
of decisions that are made on the basis of the results of a rapid 
process of heuristic reasoning. They appear when doubts arise 
regarding a course of action taken – I would say that these the‑
ories are the children of the universal need for philosophizing 
(critical thinking), which is indeed a practical need. Laymen, 
officials and judges all make their decisions relying on intu‑
itions and more or less contextualized assumptions about how 
institutions work, but still, they do not have a full account in 
the first place. The best students of law, who have acquiesced 
to all the detailed theories of civil or penal law may still not, 
and usually do not, recognize – due to a lack of reflection and 
criticism in the learning process in the first place – the multi‑
plicity and gravity of the possible philosophical assumptions 
(mainly metaphysical, epistemological and ethical) regarding 
16 This is basically what the proponents of so ‑called holistic pragma‑
tism stress (White 2004, 6).
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their object of interest, along with all the further consequences 
such assumptions yield. The simple Socratic question “What 
is (civil) law?” causes embarrassment because there is no one 
accurate, ready ‑made answer to such a question that one can 
find in (civil) law manuals. The best lawyers are rather reluc‑
tant to provide such a general answer. In that context, the de‑
mand for the average person to provide such an answer is an 
exorbitance, if not a humiliation.
There have been, however, people who have concentrated 
on providing answers to hard questions triggered by doubts re‑
garding certain “ordinary” courses of social action: the first so‑
cial, political and legal philosophers. Upon seeing that intuitive 
truisms and heuristics led to controversial results, they tried 
to develop accounts that could justify and explain these results 
(whatever they were). And once such accounts were given (as 
simple as they were), through the use of the same reflective 
mechanism, they critically assessed and discussed them. The 
philosophy of law of today is, however, both an exercise in prac‑
tical philosophy rooted in the need to justify practically mean‑
ingful decisions, but also, in significant part, a metaphilosophi‑
cal enterprise of comparing different theories of law, discussing 
the ways in which they depend on truisms and heuristics, pro‑
viding certain explanations of different meta ‑theoretical legal 
phenomena (such as theoretical disagreements) and the like. 
I am not saying that such an account is the only one possible, 
but it seems to me to be quite convincing.
3. Legal truisms, conceptual underdeterminacy  
and wise (pragmatic) choices
The naturalized approach to legal theorizing certainly re‑
quires taking into account the heuristics that are understood. 
For if one thinks that the methodology of a conceptual analysis 
– if there is any – should be grounded in empirical claims and 
should be continuous with science (as Quine, for example, de‑
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manded), then both types of truisms, together with the shared 
modes of thinking applicable to them in “typical contexts,” 
are to be recognized as the most informative, empirical evi‑
dence about the ways in which people classify the possibilities 
in their ordinary lives that a theoretician can get. Moreover, 
it seems that truisms are not necessary, analytic claims about 
the nature of the discussed thing, but are rather contingent 
claims revealing how people think about the object in narrowly 
defined circumstances. There is no one metaphysical concep‑
tion of law presumed in such uses of language or exercises of 
thought. Rather, the ordinary conception – or folk theory – of 
a certain object (here: law) is internally complex and some‑
times even logically inconsistent; it is built rather of smaller 
webs ‑of ‑beliefs, “corporate bodies,” that almost automatically 
reveal themselves in thinking about the object on certain occa‑
sions. That is why laypeople – like the first ‑day students of law 
– have so much trouble with answering the question “What is 
law?” If they try to do so, they usually refer to some experien‑
tial examples, life situations or examples from fiction to back 
up their further claims about some characteristics of law, i.e. 
truisms about law. But our main problem is not how people 
delve into their memory and imagination in order to provide 
a list of truisms about law. This certainly happens through the 
use of heuristics of some kind. But this is not our main ques‑
tion nowadays for we are more interested in describing the in‑
tellectual way that a theoretician must follow in order to build 
a theory of law.
Of course, one can certainly provide a consistent metaphys‑
ical account of the nature of law on the basis of some care‑
fully selected truisms and heuristics, and by denying others 
that contradict them, and further, by rationally developing 
them into the detailed characteristics of the object. That is 
how some accounts of law have certainly been built. Such ac‑
counts are, however, at least to the extent to which they deny 
certain ordinary ways of thinking about the object, artificial 
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and controversial, even though they have the oblique value of 
providing some theory of law (a philosophical “work of art”) 
and are “informative” for this reason. But it is hardly convinc‑
ing to say that the information here is itself information about 
the nature of a thing (at which an immodest type of analysis 
is aimed), the way people do classify things (at which a mod‑
est type of analysis is aimed), rather than simply information 
about the method one should pursue to provide one of many 
possible rational descriptions of the object.
The heuristic ‑based approach to analyzing concepts may 
surely be applied wherever there is no possibility of pro‑
viding a traditional, descriptive analysis. The task of the 
psychologically ‑oriented philosopher is described by M. John‑
ston and S. ‑J. Leslie as follows:
To put it in the broadest possible terms, psychologists seem 
most interested in discovering our criteria or ways of telling 
when a given individual has a property or falls within a speci‑
fied kind, and our criteria or ways of telling which inferences 
about members of a kind are the ones to make. But it will not 
be in general true that our ways of telling that something 
falls under a complex concept F&G is a joint application of 
our ways of telling whether something falls under the concept 
F and our ways of telling whether something falls under the 
concept G. Moreover, there is massive individual variation in 
our ways of telling whether something falls under the concept 
F; we may only be able to look it up in a book, you may have 
written the book and conducted the complex experiments 
needed to determine that it is F, and yet – so the substantial 
theory has it – all of us can share the same concept F. (John‑
ston and Leslie 2012, 119)
It seems to me that the so ‑called folk theory of law consists of 
varying types of intuitions about what law is, what good law is, 
what the function of law is, etc. A provisional list of platitudes 
(truisms) revealing these intuitions is provided by S. Shapiro, 
who writes:
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In assembling a list of truisms about law, the legal phi lo‑
sopher must include truisms about basic legal institutions 
(“All legal systems have judges,” “Courts interpret the law,” 
“One of the functions of courts is to resolve disputes,” “Every 
legal system has institutions for changing the law”); legal 
norms (“Some laws are rules,” “Some laws impose obliga‑
tions,” “Laws can apply to those who created them,” “Laws 
are always members of legal systems”); legal authority (“Le‑
gal authority is conferred by legal rules,” “Legal authorities 
have the power to obligate even when their judgments are 
wrong,” “In every legal system, some person or institution 
has supreme authority to make certain laws”); motivation 
(“Simply knowing that the law requires one to act in a cer‑
tain way does not motivate one to act in that way,” “It is 
possible to obey the law even though one does not think that 
one is morally obligated to do so,” “One can be a legal of‑
ficial even though one is alienated from one’s job”); objec‑
tivity (“There are right answers to some legal questions,” 
“Courts sometimes make mistakes when interpreting the 
law,” “Some people know more about the law than others”) 
and so on. (Shapiro 2011, 15)
Legal truisms and different types of related heuristics are com‑
mon ways of classifying the most obvious possibilities. They 
exhaust the picture of what is conceptually self ‑evident. Still, 
we must keep in mind that such truths are self ‑evident only 
prima facie and become self ‑evident in cases of the recalcitrant 
experiences I mentioned earlier.
The problem is that we usually have many possible tools 
and devices that serve as theory ‑building tools, and we may 
make many different types of methodological decisions through 
the process: Apart from methodological judgements regarding 
metatheoretical or epistemic values such as consistency, sim‑
plicity, etc., we might make more substantial judgements re‑
garding moral values. Moreover, some value judgements may 
well be supported by certain truisms and heuristics regarding 
the law itself as performed in certain contexts of decision‑
 ‑making processes.
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Law is an old social institution and only recently has there 
been a proliferation of legal theories. Our understanding of 
law was broadened substantially in the recent century, but 
still – it seems to be a reflective answer partly triggered by 
doubts regarding the decisions achieved in the simple process 
of operative, heuristic reasoning, but also sometimes support‑
ed by them. The detailed study of these decisions has always 
been an introduction to legal philosophy. I think it would not 
be controversial to claim that there are many plausible legal 
theories. What we may add (somewhat controversially) is that 
all recognizable legal theories depend on truisms to some ex‑
tent. To my mind, legal theories are underdetermined by tru‑
isms which serve as the most reliable (although not the only 
possible) evidence that a theoretician (i.e. someone devoted to 
theoretical activity) might have. Such a claim fits well with 
the pragmatist claims regarding the relation between evi‑
dence and theories in general. And the mechanism of revis‑
ing the former assumptions – including the intuitions – that 
produce decisions that yield recalcitrant feelings is consistent 
with a naturalized metaphilosophical theory of holistic prag‑
matism.
After the naturalizing turn in epistemology, all the claims of 
a conceptual analysis remained revisable as a result of a poste‑
riori theory construction in the light of the empirical evidence. 
This does not, however, mean that the methods and answers of 
philosophy must be reducible to science, in which case, “a phi‑
losophy of science is philosophy enough” – as Quine, for exam‑
ple, demanded. According to M.G. White, our normative beliefs 
may play an important role in theory (re)construction, at least 
as far as they are anchored in the “feelings of (moral) obliga‑
tion” (White 2004, 186–210) that are commonly experienced, 
and thus play a role similar to shared stimuli. Such feelings 
may have their representations or reminiscences in certain in‑
tuitions that are expressed by truisms. For this reason, many 
truisms may have a normative or even moral dimension.
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The consequence of having both normative and descrip‑
tive truisms is that we might develop different theories of law 
while relying on them: If we rely on rather descriptive truisms, 
we get more simple theories (such as legal positivism), and if 
we rely on more substantially value ‑laden truisms (such as 
truisms about the moral purpose of law), we can develop more 
normatively oriented accounts (such as nonpositivist ones). 
We might also be more skeptical about intuitions and critical‑
ly assess their reliability; but even then, we have to stick to 
some evident truths about the functioning of law (like the le‑
gal realists, who focused on truisms regarding the law as an 
instrument of social control and judicial decisions as the only 
relevant means of that control).
What is more, some truisms, as well as the theories devel‑
oped on the basis of them, may be interpreted both descrip‑
tively or normatively. Consider the truism that “law may be 
immoral,” which is a departure point for developing the well‑
 ‑known positivist separation thesis, according to which morali‑
ty and law simply are not conceptually and thus not necessarily 
interdependent.17 The point is, however, that the same truisms 
may be interpreted either descriptively or normatively, or both. 
If we say that law may be immoral, and it is a good thing to de‑
scribe it that way, we perform a more direct form of evaluation 
than when we are simply describing some important features 
of law (its relative independence from morality) in the mode of 
so ‑called indirect evaluation.18 The same truisms may express 
17 According to J. Morauta, a “separation thesis” usually appears in 
two ways: as an analytic claim about the nature of law – roughly, as some 
version of the Social Thesis; or as a substantive moral claim about the 
value of law – roughly, as some version of the No Value Thesis. He also 
correctly notices that we can discriminate between these two theses and 
the third thesis, the Neutrality Thesis, according to which analytic claims 
about the nature of law do not by themselves entail any substantive moral 
claims about the value of law (Morauta 2004, 111–135).
18 According to J. Dickson, there are two types of evaluations that 
may be applied in legal theory: direct and indirect ones (Dickson 2001).
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either descriptive or normative (moral) intuitions that are 
shared in certain kinds of common social practices regarding 
some institutions. The problem in the context of practices and 
intuition ‑ (or belief ‑) dependent concepts is that both modes 
of evaluation are “direct” in the sense that they identify im‑
portant moral functions (direct in a strict sense) and identify 
important features of the object or practice (indirect in a strict 
sense) by means of some vague generalized assumptions that 
are implicit in intuitions – namely generic generalizations 
about the law’s function, purpose or characteristics.19 If there 
is any room for social self ‑understanding of the concept of law 
in the so ‑called folk theory of law, it is in the recognition of 
these general, generic ways of ascribing descriptive features or 
moral functions to laws.
Like A. Halpin, I am eager to say that methodology in the 
social sciences is never neutral (Halpin 2010, 611; cf. Halpin 
2006, 67–105). I suppose that it is a consequence of depending 
on truisms and heuristics that leads some features and func‑
tions to be ascribed to the socially ‑dependent concepts that 
are either descriptive or normative in character. I also share 
W. Blackburn’s contention that, to a large extent, methodo‑
logical arguments are “political bids for ascendency within 
a discipline” (Blackburn 2005, 233). But even if this is so, the 
more detailed scrutiny regarding the empirical, truistic and 
heuristic ‑based origin of certain theories and their methodo‑
logies, including comparing the practical merits of different 
approaches, is something that metaphilosophers of law can do. 
According to Halpin:
Even from such a skeptical perspective, there might still be 
valuable work to be done at a less ambitious level, in investi‑
19 A. Halpin writes: “It would be simpler and more accurate to de‑
scribe it as a direct evaluation of the practice from a particular theoretical 
position: it represents what that theoretical perspective sees of value in 
the practice” (Halpin 2010, 611).
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gating how particular methodological positions relate to the 
development of legal theory, and in considering whether cer‑
tain methodological approaches are more likely to yield fruit‑
ful results. (Halpin 2010, 607)
I argue that the Platonic, Fregean approach to concepts is 
dubious, at least in connection to concepts that, by their very 
nature, play an important social function (such as “law”). 
Such concepts are not ready ‑made thoughts that can be dis‑
covered through the use of some kind of unique philosophical 
tool. Rather, the contents of these concepts must be construed 
on the basis of empirical evidence that the participants in 
society share (truisms, commonly applied heuristics). More‑
over, my approach to theorizing about such concepts is pro‑
foundly Aristotelian and practical in the sense described by 
M. Nussbaum:
The “What is it?” question, in short, is profoundly practical. In 
its absence, public life will be governed by “what is usually said 
in a jumbled fashion,” as Aristotle so nicely put this point. […]
Aristotle used this Socratic idea of philosophy to argue that 
philosophy is an important part of the equipment of every 
person who aims to take an active role in public life. (Nuss‑
baum 2001, 131)
It should be noted that the question “what is it?” is a ques‑
tion that cannot be simply equated with the question “what 
is said about it?” In the context of analyzing the concepts 
in general, one should reconcile the distinction between the 
so ‑called modest and immodest character of analysis – such 
a distinction is often made by the proponents of the tradition‑
al conceptual approach to analysis (e.g. Jackson 1998, 44). 
The “immodest” type of analysis aims at revealing the very 
nature (essence) of the thing, as it exists independently of 
the way people talk about it. On the other hand, a “modest” 
analy sis reveals only an implicit conception (theory) embed‑
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ded in different ways in the linguistic practices of a certain 
society. Thus, the former type of analysis may be seen as an 
attempt to answer the “what it really is?” question, and the 
second, the “what is said?” question. However, it is quite 
doubtful whether such a distinction pertains to the socially‑
 ‑established concept ‑term “law” that refers to a certain so‑
cial artifact. The existence and the content of law, as well as 
its concept, are not independent of what people do and say 
(and thus: “do things with words”). It seems that, at least 
partly, the question “what is law?” can be answered via an‑
swering the question “what is said about law?” However, for 
the reasons given above, the answer on this level is rather 
truistic and by no means innovative or interesting. Moreover, 
the truistic answer to this question also lacks the “pragmat‑
ic” dimension, which Nussbaum associated with Aristoteles’ 
answers to such questions. Having this in mind, we might 
say that in order to provide an interesting and pragmatically 
useful account of law, one must engage in thinking not mere‑
ly about what law is (via what is said about law), but also in 
thinking about what law should be (also – as much as possi‑
ble – via what is said and thought about law). We can easily 
see how that normative thesis about – at least a part of – the 
content of law follows from the underdeterminacy thesis pre‑
sented above. It is a kind of practical duty to choose useful 
theories from the whole set of possible theories that are un‑
derdetermined by truistic evidence.
Now, the main question is how to do that. Here comes the 
idea of heuristics and its relation to the more developed and 
more consistent modes of reflective thinking about “law” 
and the related concept ‑terms. The core point is to estab‑
lish, on the one hand, which theories of law are more prac‑
tically useful and why, and, on the other, at what point we 
could refuse to rely on certain truisms and heuristics in our 
theorizing without depriving our theories of practicality and 
plausibility.
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4. Conclusion: the oblique value of analyses  
and the promise of the heuristic ‑based approach
There are two general conclusions. The first one is that 
an analysis of social or institutional concepts has a certain 
oblique value that is epistemic in character. The analysis 
does not fulfil the main aim of traditional analysis, name‑
ly describing the pre ‑established content ‑thought of the 
concept ‑term. It is not descriptive, but rather creative, and 
as such, it has oblique value: It contributes not towards the 
main purpose of analysis as traditionally conceived, but 
rather towards the reliable development of epistemically and 
metaphysically valuable hypotheses (explanations, theories) 
in the philosophy of law and other social phenomena. Even if 
a theoretician thinks that (s)he conducts a descriptive analy‑
sis in a traditional sense, the result of theorizing – a theory 
– remains a valuable thing, even though it is not the only 
plausible description of the content of the analyzed concept. 
To the extent that the results of the analyses are simple and 
well ‑designed theories, we might think of them as proposals 
for how to use the concept ‑terms.
Moreover, I believe that the empirically informed study of 
truisms regarding law, along with a detailed scrutiny of the 
different types of common heuristics related to them, really 
could help to defend a methodologically naturalized account of 
jurisprudence against the accusation that it is “dogmatically” 
skeptical and hardly a constructive approach. K. Himma de‑
scribes the problem as follows:
No one has articulated a reasonably clear statement of how 
a naturalized jurisprudence should process with respect to 
analyzing concepts. There are many questions about law 
a naturalized methodology can answer – indeed, any empiri‑
cal question about law that has a determinate and determin‑
able answer. But how a naturalized methodology could be de‑
ployed in the service of conceptual analysis is far from clear 
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– certainly, no one has been able to explicate it with the rigor 
and elegance that Frank Jackson explicates the methodology 
of TCA [Traditional Conceptual Analysis – AD]. Indeed, for 
this reason, it is not unreasonable to think naturalized juris‑
prudence is nothing more than a skeptical theory of concep‑
tual jurisprudence, asserting, in effect, that conceptual juris‑
prudence is impossible – just as Quine believed metaphysics 
was rendered impossible by his rejection of the modalities. 
This does not seem to be a “replacement” methodology in the 
sense that we simply substitute naturalized methodology for 
TCA and keep on doing what is the same thing. Naturalized 
methodology so transforms the nature of a conceptual inquiry 
that it is no longer clear that the relevant inquiry supported 
by this methodology ought to be characterized as a “concep‑
tual” inquiry. (Himma 2015, 78)
My second conclusion with respect to the relation between le‑
gal truisms, heuristics about law, and legal theorizing can be 
presented in the form of five points:
It seems that the different general classificatory modes 
of thinking about law that are manifested in the processes of 
legal ‑decision making are a useful empirical basis for discuss‑
ing both the structure and relevance of general legal theories.
The truism ‑ and heuristic ‑based approach seems to be a re‑
liable description of the actual decision ‑making processes in 
law. The processes are, however, held in certain contexts, with 
limited information and time available, and are guided by cer‑
tain pragmatic goals.
The results of such processes usually demand further scru‑
tiny, justification and/or critique. At this point, legal theoriz‑
ing comes into play, along with conceptual analysis as its main 
method.
Conceptual analyses of truism ‑dependent concepts are 
devices for achieving certain practical ends, which are – in 
a contextually limited and often inconsistent way – realized by 
different types of legal heuristics (in the form of operational 
decisions).
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An interesting metaphilosophical study of law comprises of 
investigating the various ways in which legal theories rely on 
different but common types of legal heuristics, and eventually 
develop them into rationally ‑structured arguments consisting 
of certain webs ‑of ‑beliefs (theories) that include i.a. metaphysi‑
cal, epistemic and ethical (both normative and descriptive) 
claims about law.
As such, legal theories are analyses qua explications of 
typi cal (or common) modes of thinking about law.
This paper was written as a result of research project no. 2016/21/D/
HS5/03839, financed by the Polish National Science Centre. I would 
like to thank P. Bystranowski and M. Próchnicki for all their critical 
comments on the first draft of this paper. I take responsibility for all 
misapprehensions and mistakes.
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